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Abstract 
Urban infrastructure in the developing nations is generating 
a great number of environmental problems. Therefore, the 
problem of land distribution among road networks, parking 
spaces and landscaped parks is to be researched. The 
passenger behavior depends on traffic congestion, parking 
search time, public transport frequency, parking fee, etc. The 
travel mode choice model is described by logit function.
A city territory is subdivided into three districts, residential, 
central and industrial, each of them trying to develop and 
implement the optimal policy of land use. The district criterion 
includes residential travel times, congestion and impacts of 
the parks on the environment. Any district should solve the 
effective land use problem while the public transport system 
tries to find the optimal frequency.
The travel time depends on road capacity and is described by 
Greenshields model. The influence of parking capacity upon 
the parking search time is described by the BPR formula.
Participants’ solutions influence one another; therefore, the 
coalition-free game is constructed. The existence of Nash 
equilibrium is proved for districts, passengers and public 
transport. The numerical example shows the impacts of value 
of time (VOT), population density and parking fee rates on 
districts land use.
Keywords
land use, parking, urban transportation, public transportation, 
mode choice, environmental impacts, mathematical models, 
Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
The urban transport system optimization has been one of the 
most important socio-economic and environmental problems 
in recent decades. The problem complexity arises from the fact 
that the transportation process is associated with many issues 
affecting major society spheres. The most important issue is 
the mutual influence between the passengers’ choice of the 
transport strategy and changes in the urban transport system.
Currently the fundamental goal of many studies is the 
search of sustainable development models for cities, in 
particular, the models of citizens’ sustainable mobility. Vuchic 
(Vuchic, 1999) distinguishes four levels of transport planning 
where the first level describes the relationship between the city 
(agglomeration) and the transport system: it is interaction of 
the transport system with all other aspects of the city (economy, 
ecology, resettlement and housing, social processes, etc.). 
Land use and transport planning are not easy to integrate since 
each of them use too different tools, instruments, indicators 
of planners (Te Brömmelstroet and Bertolini, 2008), which 
is why integration of transport and land use plan making is 
still very limited in practice (Bertolini et al., 2005). The land 
use transport (LUT) visions significantly reduce the chances 
of conflicting land use and transport plans (Te Brömmelstroet 
and Bertolini, 2008). 
But in general, the problem solution depends on the 
professionalism of the planners who use simulation modelling 
tools and local optimization models. Sometimes the planners 
make wrong decisions, which only aggravate the situation, 
because they are unable to take into account passengers’ 
travel behavior that may lead to paradoxical results. Braess’s 
paradox (Braess, 1969; Ding et al., 2008) states that adding 
extra capacity to a road network may reduce overall 
performance. This is because the Nash equilibrium for such 
systems is not necessarily optimal. The Downs-Thompson 
paradox (Downs, 2004; Ding et al., 2008) states that in the 
presence of public transport increasing the capacity of public 
roads does not improve but, on the contrary, deteriorates road 
conditions. The Lewis-Mogridge position (Mogridge, 1990) is 
based on the observation that the more roads are built, then 
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more traffic there is to fill these roads. Therefore, at present the 
urban planning process requires reducing the land paved for car 
infrastructure (Litman, 2011).
The road congestion research started almost a hundred 
years ago (Greenshields, 1935) and the problem still remains. 
Numerous researchers have been studying the parking 
management problems. However, the paradoxical results of the 
research relate not only to roads but also to parking lots. Shoup 
(Shoup, 1997) stated that the authorities’ subsidy for free 
parking at work triples the vehicle operating cost for driving 
to work. The review (Hollander et al., 2006) describes several 
models of parking management that require reducing parking 
space to zero. The parking policy measures have become more 
important than many other traffic management measures for 
reducing car traffic (Litman, 2013; Rye, 2010). 
The developing countries face acute transportation problems 
which are based on the increasing rate of car ownership 
(Khovavko, 2014; Szendro and Torok, 2014). The infrastructure 
is not developing so fast – usually the land assigned to roads is less 
than 10 % against 20-35% in the developed countries (Cervero, 
2013). The cities are urgently required to realize transport 
strategies (World Bank, 2011) for decreasing negative impacts of 
transportation on the environment (Demirel et al., 2008). 
2 Models of urban passenger transportation system  
Analytical models would allow solving complex problems 
of travel demand management in real time, which is impossible 
in the existing simulation models. The analytical models will 
become an important tool for solving problems of urban transport 
systems development taking into account social, economic and 
environmental impacts. The classes of mathematical models 
describing the quality of life, urban transport system, the 
passenger decision making and tasks of municipal regulation 
of the transport system are being developed.
An urban transport system is managed by the authorities, 
passengers and different companies that can change travel 
behaviour. Therefore, transport scientists use game theory 
to describe different interests of the urban transport system 
participants. 
Simplified models, e.g. the model of travel route choice used 
in Braess’s model (Ding et al., 2008), describe interest conflicts 
only among passengers. The travel mode choice (car, railway, 
park&ride) was described in (Liu et al., 2009). The combination 
of travel route and parking choice was presented in (Balijepalli 
et al., 2008). Departure times choice allows avoiding traffic 
jams and choosing the best parking lot (Zhang et al., 2008).
Multiplayers game models describe conflicts between the 
government and the travellers. The parking fees optimisation 
(Zong et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2008) makes it possible to 
manage travellers’ parking choice. In (Basso and Silva, 2014) 
the optimization of parking space influencing travel mode 
choice was described, but the models didn’t consider the 
influence of the mode choice upon travel time (congestion). 
The models (Takayama and Kuwahara, 2016) allow optimizing 
parking and bottleneck capacities, parking fees for finding a 
social optimum.
The land use planning (Anas and Kim, 1996) describes the 
equilibrium in the land market (distribution of employment, 
shopping areas and roads) with road congestion taken into 
account.
3 Statement of the problem
Let’s consider a city model consisting of three districts, 
which are located on the same line. The territory of each district 
is split among residential areas, commercial and industrial 
complexes and the civic centre. 
But these areas do not occupy all the territory (Fig. 1), the 
remaining space is used for transportation networks (roads and 
parking spaces) and landscaped parks (environment). 
Fig. 1 The land use model for the one-dimential city 
When the traffic is fixed, the population benefits from the 
increase of roads capacity, parking space and environmental 
areas (Fig. 1). E.g., increase of the road width reduces the risks 
of traffic congestion, diminishes the travel time and decreases 
vehicle exhaust gas emission. The difficulty lies in the fact that 
the district area is limited and it is not possible to enlarge the 
spaces for parking, roads and environment simultaneously.
Therefore, the problem of rational land use planning is 
an extremely complicated one for most cities. The statement 
of the problem considered in this article enables finding the 
equilibrium distribution of the district land, since finding the 
optimal solution for all cities is almost impossible due to the 
non-convex dependency and the large number of variables in 
a real sized city.
The city model includes residential, central and industrial 
districts. Residential district 1 doesn’t have a parking space due 
to the absence of a working area. Industrial district 3 has no 
need of additional recreational areas. Extended central business 
district 2 consists of residential, shopping and working areas.
The origin-destination matrix is fixed, and thus the presented 
model is simplified, i.e. the problems of trip generation and trip 
distribution are not considered. Nevertheless, each passenger 
flow will split into a transit mode and a car mode. The flows 
inside each district are not included into the model as the 
district facilities are located within walking distance.
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Also only morning commuters from residential areas 
(District 1, 2) to working areas (Districts 2, 3) are considered. 
Consequently, we have only 3 passenger flows (Fig. 2), each 
of them trying to find an optimal proportion of a transit mode 
and a car mode.
Fig. 2 Linkage of traffic flows between districts 
with parking spaces and road network
The problem of land use is specified individually for each 
district. The district should allocate the land to green spaces, 
parking lots and roads in order to find the best way to meet the 
needs of the district population.
The public transport also must satisfy the requirements of 
passengers to transit mode.
All the above-mentioned three types of participants 
(3 passenger flows, 3 districts and public transport) form a 
model; therefore, the game-theoretic model with 7 players will 
be described in the next part of the article.
4 Mathematical model
We introduce some basic parameters, most of which relate 
to district  i :  s i r land for roads;  s i p land for parking;  s i e land for 
landscaped parks. The district land for such objects is limited 
by  s i  , therefore, the inequality constraint arises
s s s si
r
i
p
i
e
i+ + ≤ .
The parameter  λ i,j presents flow of the movements by public 
and private transport from district  i to district  j . The probability 
of using a car for a trip between districts is  p i,j ;  hence, the 
probability of using public transport is  1 −  p i,j .
Thus the car traffic in district  i ( Λ 
i
 ):
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All traffic moves through district 2 (3). The amount of 
occupied parking lots for each district  i (Pi)
P p ii j i j i
j
j i
= =
=
≠
∑λ , ,
1
3
 ,   1, 2, 3.
The time - spending functions in each district i are:  T i p ( s i p , P i ) 
- search time in a car park, which depends on the parking 
capacity and car traffic, i.e. the number of cars to which the 
given district is assigned as a destination point (occupied land); 
T i r ( s i r , Λ i ) the driving time, which depends on the road width 
and traffic;  T i t ( s i r , Λ i ) the travel time if using public transport 
(without the variable of waiting time  t w ).
Traffic congestion influences travel time by transit mode if 
public transport uses public roads. The using of dedicated bus 
lanes significantly reduces the impact of  s i r and  Λ i . The transit 
fare is denoted as  c  t .
The integral cost function of car travel between the districts 
depends on the travel time. E.g., the integral cost for car travel 
from district 1 to district 2
C c T T T cr c r r p p1 2 1 2 2 2, ,= + +( ) +
where  c c  is average value of time and  с j p is parking fee.
Describing the influence of traffic upon environment we 
should take into account various parameters, such as the effect 
of transportation on soil, air (including noise), water course, 
but first and foremost, the residents’ health and comfort of 
life, the last two parameters should be expressed monetary. 
The environmental damage, first of all, the impact of traffic 
upon the people’s health, most of all depends on car travel time 
(including both parking and driving): the longer travel time gets 
(due to traffic congestion), the more serious damage is caused. 
The environmental damage parameter is  D per one engine 
hour. Positive influence on the residents’ health is exerted by 
landscaped parks; the parameter of environment improvement 
is  E per the parks square. Evaluation of the environmental 
parameters ( D and  E ) is a complicated problem which is not 
supposed to be solved in this article.
Thus environmental improvement (minus means damage) 
for district 1 is
Es DT p p p p
DT p
e r
p
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 31 31
2 2 1 2
− + + +( )
−
λ λ λ λ
λ
, , , , , , , ,
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4.1 Passenger decision making
The travel mode choice is an important step of the transporta-
tion forecasting (Litman, 2011). A private car and public trans-
port are the main travel modes for a long-distance travel. 
The passenger flows try to find an optimal proportion between 
using a private car and public transport. In the developing 
nations low income residents prefer to use public transport (cars 
allow reducing the travel time while the travel cost increases). 
The travellers’ value of time was presented by exponential 
(Koryagin, 2015) or uniform (Dodgson and Katsoulacos, 1988) 
distribution, though usually for travel mode choice the logit 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
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functions are used, which allow taking into account particular 
qualities of passengers (Hollander et al., 2006; Koryagin and 
Dekina, 2014; Bravo et al., 2009). 
The presented logit function computes the probability of 
car mode choice, which depends on the difference between the 
travel time  Δt  and the travel costs  Δc :
p t c
a a c t a ct
c
c
* ,
exp
.∆ ∆
∆ ∆
( ) =
+ + +( )
1
1 0
The objective function based on logit function may be 
presented in the following equation (Hollander et al., 2006; 
Koryagin and Dekina, 2014):
G p p p t c
p
a a t a c ct c
c p
( ) = − ( )( )
= −
+ + +( )








→
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2
0
2
1
1
.
Claim 1. Function  G (p) is convex downward in the 
parameter  p .
Proof. The second derivative of (9) is as follows:
G''(p) = 2p ≥ 0. QED
The difference of the travel times between modes (private 
and public transport) for travelling between districts 1 and 2
∆t T T T T T tr r p t t w1 2 1 2 2 1 2, ,= + + − − −
where  t w - public transport waiting time.
The difference between the travel costs would be
∆c c t t t c cc r r p p t1 2 1 2 2 2, .= + +( ) + −
4.2 Search time in a car park
Travel time depends on road and car park capacity. Usually 
the time is described by the standard Bureau of Public Roads 
(BPR) function (Balijepalli et al., 2008)
t t q
q
= +






0 α
β
max
where  t 0 is minimal search time in a car park (for a free park), 
q max - parking capacity (number of lots),  q - the number of cur-
rently occupied lots,  α and  β are nonnegative parameters.
The different parking conditions in each district  i depend on 
the parking size and form 
T s t
P
si
p
i
p
i i
i i
i
p
i
( ) = + 





0 α
γ
β
where  γ i is the average square of a parking lot.
Claim 2. Function  T i p ( s i p ) is convex downward in the param-
eter  s i p .
Proof. The second derivative of  T i p ( s i p ) is as follows:
α β β
γ β
βi i i
i
i
p
P
s
i
i
+( ) ( )
( )
≥+1 02 . QED
4.3 Driving time
Researchers prefer to use the simplest submodels for con-
structing a huge model. Usually the travel time (or speed) is 
described by BPR style function (Balijepalli et al., 2008; Basso 
and Silva, 2014; Bravo et al., 2009) or Greenberg’s model 
(Greenberg, 1959). The travel time in these models depends on 
ratio of traffic density to road capacity. 
In the present article the classical Greenshields formula 
(Greenshields, 1935) is used which is a particular case of 
Greenberg’s model. In its classic form, the model describes 
the dependency between the flow speed and the traffic density. 
However, it is easy to obtain the dependency between travel 
times and traffic flows (Koryagin, 2015).
t L
v v v
j
=
+ −
2
4
0 0
2 0λ
ρ
where  L is the length of a road section,  v 0 is free speed,  λ is a 
traffic flow,  ρ j is the road capacity. Therefore, the travel time 
through the district  i will be
T s L
v v v
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i
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i
r i
i
i
r
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2
4
0 0
2 0δ Λ
where  L i is the length of a road in district 1 and δ  is the area 
occupied by a vehicle on the road jammed with traffic.
Claim 3. Function  T i r ( s i r ) is convex downward in the param-
eter  s i p .
Proof. The second derivative of  T i r ( s i r ) is as follows:
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4.4 District policy
Each district is sensible to the environment condition and 
residents’ travel time ( T i ). The total residents’ travel time 
expenditures for district 1 consist of four summands (public 
transport and car travels from district 1 to district 2 and from 
district 1 to district 3):
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
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The objective function for district 1 includes the total travel 
time expenditures, environmental damage from cars and the 
environmental area.
F s D p p T s
E s s c T s
r r r
r c r
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) = +( ) ( )
− −( ) + (
λ λ, , , , ,Λ
)→ min
sr1
The objective function for district 2 also takes into account 
parking space:
F s s D p p p T sr p r r2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2, ,, , , , , ,( ) = + +( ) ( )λ λ λ Λ
                 + ( ) + ( ) − − −c T s s D p T s P E s s sc r p p p r2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, ,, ,λ p
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,2 2
District 3 doesn’t have a residential area, therefore, environ-
mental condition isn’t taken into account:
F s s c T s sr p c r p
s sr p
3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3
, , min.
,
( ) = ( )→
Claim 4. Function  F i is convex downward in the parameters 
s i r ,  s i p .
Proof. It should be noted that  T i ( s i r ,  s i p ) consists of the functions 
T i r ( s i r , Λ i ) and  T i p ( s i p ,  P i ) . Therefore, functions F1, F2, F3 consist 
of a linear part and summands  T i r ( s i r , Λ i ) and  T i p ( s i p ,  P i ) with 
nonnegative factors. The proof of Claim 4 is obvious because 
of Claims 2 and 3. QED
4.5 Public transport
The third type of players is represented by the public trans-
port. Note that it’s not a good idea to use profit as a criterion 
for the public transport because it performs a social function 
and is supported from the municipal budget. The desire to 
maximize profit may lead to lower quality of public trans-
port services the notable example of which is the paradox of 
Downs. Therefore, we will use the total expenditure on public 
transport and passengers’ travel time as a criterion. The public 
transport strategy is the frequency or average interval, which 
is equal to 2 average waiting times.
H c T t p a
t
c
k
t
w
k i
j
i j i j
j ii w
tw
= +





 −( ) + →
== +=
∑∑∑ λ , , min1
2
1
3
1
3
,
where  a is the cost of 1 round trip of public transport.
In this model public transport uses dedicated lanes or ways 
(e.g., trams). Therefore, congestion doesn’t influence the travel 
time and the transport operator’s expenses. That is why using 
dedicated lanes is often resorted to for reducing the public 
transport subsidy (Basso and Silva, 2014) and, consequently, 
the load on the budget. 
Claim 5. Function  H is convex downward in the parameter  t w . 
Proof. The second derivative of  H is as follows:
a
tw
3
0≥ . QED
If the public transport uses public roads, then the travel time 
(and therefore, expenses) will be dependent on traffic conges-
tion. Such condition makes the formula more complicated but 
it serves the convexity of public transport criterion.
4.6 Game-theoretical problem formulation
The researchers often use the game theory for solving urban 
transport problems (Chen and Cheng, 2010). The theory describes 
mutual influence of transport and land-use (Chang and Mackett, 
2005); the relationship between the government, car users and 
the parking system (Zong et al., 2015); the parking policy as a 
conflict of interests between the government and the travellers 
(Hollander et al., 2006); the interaction between the transport 
operator, passengers and the authorities (Koryagin, 2015).
The game theory will allow considering features of travel 
demand generation. Thus, the equilibrium between the interests 
of the population and the capacity of transport infrastructure 
is found, which will provide an important tool for designing 
urban transport systems.
Let us introduce some sets of strategies, and first of all, the 
sets of passenger strategies (pi,jbelongs to the  I i,j =  [0, 1] ). For 
district 1 the strategy  s 
1
 r belongs to the  B 
1
 =  |0,  s 1 | . District 3 
strategy  s 
3
 r belongs to the  B 
3
 =  |0,  s 3 | . District 2 has a more 
complicated set of strategies (triangle)
B
s
s
s s S
r
p
r p
2
2
2
2 2 2
0
0=
≥
≥
+ ≤






.
The maximal waiting time  
_
 t must be determined by the 
urban authorities. The minimal rational waiting time (for the 
maximal passenger flow) is calculated from the solution of (20)
t a
cc i j
j ii
=
= +=
∑∑2
1
3
1
3
λ ,
Therefore, the public transport strategy tw belongs to the 
J = [ ṯ, t̄ ].
The normal for game statement of the problem is
 < I 1,2 ,  I 1,3 ,  I 2,3 ,  B 1 ,  B 2 ,  B 3 , J,− G 1,2 , − G 1,3 , − G 2,3 , − F 1 ,− F 2 , − F 3 ,−H> .
Proposition 1. The game
 < I 1,2 ,  I 1,3 ,  I 2,3 ,  B 1 ,  B 2 ,  B 3 , J, − G 1,2 ,− G 1,3 ,− G 2,3 , − F 1 , − F 2 ,− F 3 ,− H> 
has Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the conditions of the Nash equilibrium exis-
tence theorem (Glicksberg, 1952).
1. Set of players’ pure strategies is compact, convex and 
not empty. 
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
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The condition is obviously performed for sets
  I 
1,2
 ,  I 
1,3
 ,  I 
2,3
 ,  B 
1
 ,  B 2 ,  B 3 , J .
2. Players payoff functions are quasiconcave in self 
strategies and continuous.
The functions  −  G 
1,2
 , −  G 
1,3
 , −  G 
2,3
 are quasiconcave through 
Claim 1. The functions  −  F 
1
 , −  F 2 , −  F 3 are quasiconcave in 
accordance with Claim 4. The functions −H are quasiconcave 
with respect to Claim 5. QED 
The existence of Nash equilibrium allows using the pre-
sented model for solution of the urban land use problem, 
which will be described in the following example.
5 Numerical example
The value of basic parameters are: number of trips 
λ
1,2
 = λ
1,3
 = λ
2,3
 = 20000; transit tariff  c  t = 17 ; travel time by 
transit mode  T i t = 0.667 ; VOT  c c = 200 ; damage  D = 50 per 
car hour; environment improvement  E = 3000000 per km2; 
logit function parameters  a 0 = − 2 ,  a t = 0.08 ,  a c = 0.2 ; BPR 
function parameters  α i = 0.3 ,   β i = 3 ; free speed  v 0 = 40 ; 
road length  L i = 4 ; road square for a car  δ = 0, 000017 km2.
One of the main factors that is changing in the developing 
countries is the value of time. This model (Fig. 3) shows that 
as income increases the probability of using a car soars, but 
at a certain level (the level of developed countries) the use of 
personal vehicles goes down. 
Fig. 3 The influence of VOT on travel mode choice
There is no parking space in the first district. The landscaped 
area is growing (Fig. 4), but it stabilizes if the VOT exceeds 300 
(of course, the situation will change if we take into account the 
correlation between the VOT and the importance of ecology).
For the second district the situation is similar (Fig. 5), but 
the transport infrastructure includes not only roads but parking 
space as well. Note that the area under roads is practically 
unchanged and roads and parking spaces together occupy 
a smaller territory than landscaping, although the transport 
infrastructure quantity is slightly bigger than that of parks. 
For the third district the share of roads and parking spaces is 
virtually equal because the numbers of cars on the roads and in 
parking lots are identical (Fig. 6). 
Fig. 4 The influence of VOT on district 1 land-use
Fig. 5 The influence of VOT on district 2 land-use
Fig. 6 The influence of VOT on district 3 land-use
It is difficult to compare the three districts because they all 
use the land differently. It is only possible to compare the area 
paved for roads which is the largest in district 3 and the smallest 
in district 2 where congestion is highly likely. 
The public transport frequency gradually increases from 15 
to 60 because the optimal frequency depends on the VOT (20).
An important parameter of the city is the population density. 
In this case as the population density correlates with the intensity 
of passenger flows, we consider this parameter in our study. The 
passenger flow increases for each O-D pair simultaneously. 
The growth of population density (Fig. 7) leads to reduction 
of the landscaping area while the space for roads and parking 
proportionally increases.
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Fig. 7 The influence of population density on district 2 land-use
Another important way to manage the transport system is 
the introduction of parking fees in order to reduce vehicular 
flows. Fig. 8 shows that at low fees the area under the transport 
infrastructure even increases while at high fees the area of 
landscaping grows and reaches 60% of the city territory.
Fig. 8 The influence of parking fees on district 2 land use
Note that the probability of private cars usage is reduced from 
70 to 25%. The public transport frequency increases slightly from 
25 to 38 and car travel time shrinks by 7%. It should be noted 
that this model compares the Nash equilibrium for the given 
parameters. However, not always the local authorities assess 
the situation adequately and their unsustainable transport policy 
usually leads to the city degradation.
6 Conclusions
The main result of the research is the construction of a math-
ematical model aimed at rational urban land use. The existence 
and uniqueness of a solution (Nash equilibrium) allows effi-
cient usage of the model. The numerical example let us recom-
mend that the developing countries should: 
• increase green areas; 
• reduce the area paved for roads, especially in the urban 
centre;
• increase the public transport frequency;
• limit the population density; 
• increase parking fees.
• The development of the proposed model might be 
implemented in the following directions:
• generalization of the one-dimensional model for any 
number of districts;
• generalization in case of the two – dimensional model for 
rectangular urban patterns, which demands a description 
of the routes between the two districts through the third 
one with regard to road intersection. Also it will be 
necessary to consider the route choice model;
• research of the correlation among the factors (VOT, 
transit tariff, parking fees, environmental damage and 
resident’s benefits, etc.);
• taking account of trip generation and allocation;
• considering the transit routes network and various types 
of public transport (with dedicated lines and without 
them) and tariff optimization;
• considering more travel types (not only morning 
commutes), including cultural and social ones.
• implementation of the proposed model in a real city.
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